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In the last few decades, Congress has passed a variety of statutes to
improve legal protections for federal employee-whistleblowers, with the dual
goals of promoting disclosure of wrongdoing and prohibiting retaliation
against whistleblowers. However, these statutes and goals were undermined
during the Trump administration. This Article argues that President Trump’s
administration conducted multi-faceted attacks against federal employeewhistleblowers in order to deter disclosure of the administration’s
wrongdoing. Since these efforts began, there has been a decrease in
whistleblower disclosures of wrongdoing in the federal government. In order
to stop this trend, immediate action is needed, including amending federal
laws to reduce the possibility of retaliation by administration officials against
whistleblowers, increasing funding and staffing at the federal agencies
tasked with protecting whistleblowers and adjudicating their retaliation
claims, and promoting greater outreach by congressional committees to
federal employees within agencies over which such committees have
oversight authority. If these steps are not taken, there is a significant risk that
the culture of promoting whistleblowing that has been cultivated within the
federal government will collapse, leaving the American public in the dark
about future misconduct within the Executive branch of the government.
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INTRODUCTION
President Trump’s administration produced a surfeit of high-profile
whistleblowers. Ranging from the whistleblower who jumpstarted the House
of Representative’s investigation into the Ukraine scandal to the
whistleblower who brought allegations of Russian bounties on American
troops to light, these individuals illustrate the increasing importance of
whistleblowing in the public sector as well as the lack of adequate protections
for whistleblowers. As to the former, it is quite possible that without the
individual who reported the call with the Ukrainian president, there would
have been no impeachment of President Trump. And as to the latter,
traditional protections for whistleblowers, which focus on preventing the
agency in which the whistleblower works from retaliating against that
whistleblower, are inadequate to protect whistleblowers in the federal
government. Indeed, the steps President Trump and his administration took
to quell whistleblowers have undermined the whistleblower protection
system. Unless protections for whistleblowers are strengthened, and the
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culture of antagonism to whistleblowers changes, it is likely that the number
of public sector whistleblowers will drop, which may have catastrophic
effects on the viability of our democracy.
This Article will proceed in three parts. Part I will outline the
development of whistleblower protections for federal government employees
and the current state of these protections. Part II will expose how the Trump
administration undermined these protections in myriad ways, including
outright ignoring the prohibitions on retaliation against whistleblowers,
increasing resources devoted to investigating and prosecuting employees
who disclose wrongdoing to the press, threatening and encouraging others to
threaten whistleblowers on social media, and under-funding and -staffing the
federal agencies responsible for assisting whistleblowers and adjudicating
their retaliation claims. Part III proposes solutions to mitigate the damage in
order to restore the whistleblowing promotion and protection culture within
the federal government.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEE-WHISTLEBLOWER SYSTEM
Legal protections for whistleblowers began more than a century ago
with concerns about protecting the government. As early as the Civil War, an
early form of whistleblower encouragement was enacted to battle against
fraud by government contractors. 1 Fast-forward a century, and the federal
government developed the blueprint for current whistleblower protections
throughout the country. The contours of protections for federal employees,
the importance of whistleblowers within the federal government, and the
trends in whistleblower disclosure and retaliation are discussed below.
A. Development of Whistleblower Protections for Government Employees
Modern protections for government whistleblowers began with the
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA). As stated in the Act:
Employees should be protected against reprisal for the
lawful disclosure of information which the employees
reasonably believe evidences—
(A) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or
(B) mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse
of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public
health or safety.2
1

See NANCY M. MODESITT, JANIE F. SCHULMAN & DANIEL P. WESTMAN,
WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE ch. 1, at 4–5 (3d ed. 2015)
(describing the evolution of whistleblower protections in the United States).
2
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 2301(b)(9), 92 Stat. 1111, 1114 (1978).
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The Civil Service Reform Act also created the Office of Special
Counsel (OSC), which is an independent entity that promotes whistleblowing
within the federal government and protects whistleblowers against reprisal.3
In addition to the authority given to the Special Counsel to investigate
retaliation allegations, 4 the Special Counsel is also tasked with bringing
disciplinary proceedings against those who engaged in such retaliation. 5
That same year that Congress passed the Civil Service Reform Act,
Congress also created a secondary system to promote whistleblowing within the
federal government by enacting the Inspector General Act. The Inspectors
General were tasked with conducting audits of their agencies, investigating fraud
and abuse, and reporting on these to Congress and the head of their agencies.6
Putting together the provisions of the Civil Service Reform Act and the
Inspector General Act, federal employees who wanted to report wrongdoing in
the government could take a variety of approaches: (1) they could report
wrongdoing within their governmental unit; (2) they could report wrongdoing
to OSC; and/or (3) they could report wrongdoing to their agency’s Inspector
General. Regardless of the approach taken, the CSRA was supposed to protect
them from retaliation. However, limitations in the initial statute, as well as
subsequent court decisions interpreting the statute, made it difficult for some
whistleblowers to receive the promised protection against retaliation.7
Recognizing this, Congress has acted twice since the enactment of the
Civil Service Reform Act to significantly enhance protections for
whistleblowers. First, the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 substantially
modified the provisions of the CSRA to better protect whistleblowers.8 It
created an independent right of action for federal employee whistleblowers
who had suffered from retaliation, rather than forcing them to rely upon OSC
to pursue their claims. 9 It also lowered the causation standard, allowing
whistleblower claims to succeed so long as the whistleblower could establish
3

For a detailed history of the OSC and its role in supporting federal employeewhistleblowers, see Bruce D. Fong, Whistleblower Protection and the Office of Special
Counsel: The Development of Reprisal Law in the 1980s, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1015 (1991).
4
5 U.S.C. § 1214.
5
Id. § 1215. Interestingly, this provision shows that Congress was clearly concerned about
political appointees retaliating against federal workers. Id. Section (b) provides for the
Special Counsel to submit reports of such retaliation to the President. Id. Apparently,
Congress did not envision the current scenario where the President would be the one
spearheading the retaliation charge. See discussion infra Section II.A.
6
Civil Service Reform Act §§ 2, 4.
7
See MODESITT ET AL., supra note 1, at ch. 8, § A, at 3–13 (discussing the development of
the CSRA).
8
Id. § 8-4.
9
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). For the individual right of action provision,
see 5 U.S.C. § 1221.
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that their protected disclosure of information was a contributing factor in
action taken against them. 10 In order to further protect whistleblowers against
retaliation, Congress also prohibited OSC from disclosing the identity of
whistleblowers except in extremely limited circumstances. 11
While these changes were beneficial to whistleblowers, the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals limited the scope of these protections through its
interpretations of the statutory scheme. 12 As a result, several decades later,
the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA) was passed
to reverse many of these interpretations of the law. For example, the WPEA
reversed decisions that had eliminated protections for whistleblowers who
made disclosures as part of their job duties. 13 It also broadened the scope of
protected activities to include any disclosure made in connection with an
OSC investigation, not just those made by the primary whistleblower.14
As might be evident from this brief overview, the trend in this area of
the law has been to increase legal protections for federal employeewhistleblowers against retaliation. This increased protection recognizes the
importance of whistleblowing within the federal government, which is
discussed below.
B. Importance of Whistleblowing in the Federal Government and Disturbing
Trends in Whistleblowing Data
Whistleblowing is a critically important method of uncovering
wrongdoing within any organization. Indeed, one study indicated that
whistleblowing is the primary method for organizations to detect fraud. 15 As
the head of OSC, Special Counsel Kerner emphasized the importance of
whistleblowers in the federal government, saying: “[w]histleblowers are our
front-line in rooting out fraud and wrongdoing at all levels of government.” 16
Within the federal government, whistleblowers have uncovered gross waste

5 U.S.C. § 1214 (containing the “contributing factor” standard).
MODESITT ET AL., supra note 1, § 8-4.
12
Id. § 8-7.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
See W. Michael Hoffman & Mark S. Schwartz, The Morality of Whistleblowing: A
Commentary on Richard T. De George, 127 J. BUS. ETHICS 771, 771–73 (2015) (discussing
existing research on the topic); Muel Kaptein, From Inaction to External Whistleblowing:
The Influence of the Ethical Culture of Organizations on Employee Responses to Observed
Wrongdoing, 98 J. BUS. ETHICS 513, 513–16 (2011) (discussing the importance of
whistleblowers in detecting organizational wrongdoing).
16
Special Counsel Henry J. Kerner Statement on National Whistleblower Appreciation Day,
U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. (July 30, 2019), https://osc.gov/News/Pages/19-13-SpecialCounsel-Whistleblower-Appreciation-Day.aspx [https://perma.cc/GL45-SGL4].
10
11
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that has cost millions of dollars, 17 violations of safety standards that are
designed to protect the public, 18 and potentially unlawful or corrupt behavior
at the highest levels of government. 19
Despite the obvious importance of whistleblowers in the federal
government, it is impossible to determine the precise number of
whistleblowers in the federal government. This is because there is no entity
that centrally records allegations by whistleblowers. While many federal
employees do have an option to report wrongdoing to the OSC, the entity
tasked with protecting whistleblowers, there is no requirement that they do
so. Thus, some employees will report wrongdoing to OSC, while others will
work within their own agency to report wrongdoing, such as by contacting
the Inspector General for their agency.
The figures on whistleblowing that are obtainable are numbers of
employees who report wrongdoing outside of their agency by bringing it to
the attention of OSC through a whistleblower disclosure report. Beyond that,
one must extrapolate from the number of retaliation claims filed, where an
employee alleges that they reported wrongdoing and suffered adverse
consequences as a result.
Since fiscal year (FY) 2006, the number of whistleblower disclosures
made to OSC increased significantly over time until FY 2015. In FY 2006,
there were only 435 whistleblower disclosures made to OSC.20 As of FY
2008, the number had only modestly increased, by approximately one
hundred disclosures.21 However, between FY 2008 and FY 2012, the total
number of disclosures rose steeply, reaching 1,148 in FY 2012.22 The peak
number of whistleblower disclosures to OSC was reached in FY 2015, in
which OSC received 1,965 disclosures. 23 Since then, the number has

VA Wasted $223 Million on Transport Services, Failed to Pay Veterans’ Medical Bills
Resulting in Denied Care, U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. (Dec. 13, 2019), https://osc.gov/
News/Pages/20-07-VA-Wasted-223-Million.aspx [https://perma.cc/J669-US8G].
18
OSC Obtains $90K in Damages for Whistleblower Retaliated Against After Disclosing
Unqualified Flight Safety Inspectors, U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. (Feb. 24, 2020), https://osc.gov/
News/Pages/20-11-Damages-for-Whistleblower-Flight-Safety-Inspectors.aspx [https://perma.
cc/BYQ7-PSLC].
19
See infra Sections II.A–C (detailing the retaliation against whistleblowers who have
disclosed wrongdoing in the Trump administration).
20
2011 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 27. For the purposes of this Article, all
numbers of disclosures refer to disclosures made in a particular fiscal year, not the total
number of disclosures that OSC handled in a fiscal year. The total number of disclosures
handled in a fiscal year is higher than the total number of disclosures made to the agency
because some matters are carried over from one fiscal year to the next.
21
Id.
22
2013 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 36.
23
2019 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 27.
17
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fluctuated, but mainly declined, with 1,559 whistleblower disclosures in FY
2018 and 1,373 in FY 2019.24
Whistleblower disclosures only reveal a partial picture of actual
whistleblowing that occurs within federal agencies. As noted above, some
employees elect not to make a disclosure to OSC, and instead work within
their agency to disclose wrongdoing. These situations are not captured by the
whistleblower disclosure data. However, a portion of these situations do
come to OSC’s attention—specifically, when a whistleblower files a claim
with OSC that they have been retaliated against for having blown the whistle.
As to these retaliation claims, it appears that the number is higher than the
number of whistleblowing disclosures and has increased in recent years.25 In
FY 2006, up to 1,805 PPP complaints 26 were made to OSC. That number
steadily rose and by FY 2012, the Office of Special Counsel received 2,969
complaints,27 an increase of approximately 1,100 since FY 2006. 28 By FY
2018, that number had increased significantly again, growing to its highest
level ever, at 4,168.29

24

Id.
OSC tracks the number of retaliation complaints as part of the broader group of “prohibited
personnel practices” (PPPs) that include some matters that do not involve retaliation. OSC
does not disaggregate the data on PPPs; thus, the best approximation we have on the trends
in retaliation complaints is based on this number of PPP complaints filed. Throughout the
passage below, the term “PPP complaint” references these PPP complaints.
26
2011 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 17; see also id. at 12 (referring to
“whistleblower retaliation” claims—along with claims for retaliation for exercising an
appeal right, due process violations, other legal violations, and marital discrimination—as
“prohibited personnel practice complaints”).
27
2019 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 16. Annual reports from the Merit System
Protection Board (MSPB) also provide some information about the number of whistleblower
retaliation claims brought by federal employees. See 2019–2021 U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD.
ANN. PERFORMANCE REP. & ANN. PERFORMANCE PLAN 51 (detailing petitions for review
relating to whistleblower appeals for FY 2019). The number of initial whistleblower appeals
in 2019, filed under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) and (9), was 691. Id. There were also eight-seven
refiled whistleblower appeals and eleven cases remanded which, if included, would put the
grand total of whistleblower cases filed with the MSPB last year at 789. Id. However, these
cases represent only a portion of the total number of cases that involve claims of retaliation
because of the different ways in which retaliation claims can be filed. The above numbers
represent claims filed as an individual right of action—all of which are whistleblowing
claims. A claim involving whistleblowing could also be filed as an appeal of a dismissal for
performance reasons, which would not necessarily be captured in the MSPB’s data as a
whistleblowing claim. Furthermore, an undeterminable number of these MSPB claims will
involve matters previously brought to OSC’s attention. Thus, the number of MSPB claims is
both over- and under-inclusive of the number of whistleblowers in the federal government
and seems less accurate than the OSC figures.
28
See 2019 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 16 (summarizing the number of complaints
from FY 2012 to FY 2019).
29
Id.
25
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Two central points emerge from this information on rates of
whistleblowing. First, regardless of the metric used (whistleblower
disclosures or retaliation claims filed), whistleblowing behavior had been
increasing in the federal government up until around 2015.30 The growth in
the number of whistleblowers could be the result of a number of factors. First,
it could reflect an increase in the confidence of whistleblowers that they
would not face retaliation, or that if they did, retaliation would be mitigated
when they filed a claim with OSC. Support for this hypothesis is found in the
transformation of OSC between the George W. Bush administration and the
Obama administration. The Special Counsel appointed by Bush was widely
viewed as ineffective and not supportive of whistleblowers.31 Indeed, he
ultimately plead guilty to criminal contempt of Congress when he removed
information from OSC computers that would have revealed his refusal to
protect federal employees under his office’s mandate. 32 This changed
dramatically under the Obama administration,33 where the Special Counsel was
so well-regarded that even a number of Republicans advocated for her retention
after President Obama left office.34 Supporting this hypothesis, whistleblower
disclosure numbers were fairly stagnant between FY 2006 and FY 2008,35 with
an increase of about fifty each year. Special Counsel Scott Bloch announced his
resignation one month into FY 2009,36 and in FY 2009, the number of

30

See id. (showing increasing number of retaliation claims until FY 2015); 2012 U.S. OFF.
SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 14 (showing increasing number of retaliation claims from FY
2007 to FY 2012, with the exception of a slight decrease between FY 2009 and FY 2010);
id. at 31 (showing increasing number of whistleblower disclosures from FY 2007 to FY
2012, with numbers of disclosures more than doubling in that interval, with the exception of
a slight decrease in disclosures from FY 2010 to FY 2011).
31
See Joe Davidson, Workers Applaud Special Counsel’s Return to Private Sector, WASH.
POST (Oct. 22, 2008), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/21/
AR2008102102572.html [https://perma.cc/7CVH-3CKF] (noting comments by workers’
organizations and federal employees that the office failed to support whistleblowers).
32
Spencer S. Hsu, Head of Bush Administration’s Whistle-Blower Protection Office Faces
Prison, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2011/02/03/AR2011020306810.html [https://perma.cc/3WWW-AYLH].
33
See Joe Davidson, Under Carolyn Lerner, Special Counsel Office is Doing Its Job Now,
Observers Say, WASH. POST (June 28, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/under-carolyn-lerner-special-counsel-office-is-doing-its-job-now-observers-say/2012/
06/28/gJQApX229V_story.html [https://perma.cc/77WB-5MLA] (discussing workers’
positive reactions to and whistleblower advocates’ praise for OSC’s new head).
34
See Joe Davidson, Special Counsel Lerner Leaves Office as Trump Rejects Highly Praised
Whistleblower Advocate, WASH. POST (June 7, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.washington
post.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/06/07/lerner-leaves-office-of-special-counsel-as-trumpsrejects-highly-praised-whistleblower-advocate/ [https://perma.cc/CA9Y-NDJT] (noting
support for the retention of Carolyn Lerner among Republicans).
35
2011 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 27.
36
See Davidson, supra note 31 (discussing Bloch’s announcement of his resignation).
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whistleblower disclosures jumped by nearly 200 reports.37 Taken together, the
timing of Special Counsel Bloch’s resignation and the sharp increase in
whistleblower disclosures could be read to support this hypothesis.
Another potential reason for the increase in the number of
whistleblowers could be an increase in the behavior subject to
whistleblowing. There is also support for this position in the data. During FY
2014, there was a large spike in whistleblower disclosures, with
approximately 400 more disclosures than were made in the previous year. 38
There was another large increase in FY 2015 of approximately 400
disclosures.39 OSC does not report the agency where the disclosing employee
worked, but it appears likely that at least some of these disclosures were
related to a major scandal at the Department of Veterans Affairs. In early
2014, significant problems had been exposed in the provision of medical
services to veterans. 40 And while OSC does not disclose the agency for whom
employees making whistleblower disclosures worked, there is evidence that
some employees at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) did report
wrongdoing and were retaliated against. 41 Between FY 2013 and FY 2014,
the number of PPP complaints made by employees at the Department of
Veterans Affairs increased by approximately 500. 42 Between FY 2014 and
FY 2015, the number of these complaints increased again by approximately
600.43 The number of these PPP complaints then leveled off in FY 2016, and

37

2011 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 27.
See 2018 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 31 (detailing the rise in disclosures from
1,129 in FY 2013 to 1,554 in FY 2014).
39
Id.
40
See Michael Pearson, The VA’s Troubled History, CNN (May 30, 2014),
https://www.cnn.com/2014/05/23/politics/va-scandals-timeline/index.html
[https://perma.cc/8BXQ-NQ8B] (noting the January 2014 scandal over delays in treating
veterans and falsification of medical records to cover up the delays).
41
See, e.g., 2013 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 15 (identifying source of complaints,
with VA totaling 985); 2014 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 16 (identifying source of
complaints, with VA totaling 1,504); 2015 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 15
(identifying source of complaints, with VA totaling 2,165); 2016 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS.
ANN. REP. 14 (identifying source of complaints, with VA totaling 1,887); 2017 U.S. OFF.
SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 14 (identifying source of complaints, with VA totaling 1,824);
2018 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 13 (identifying source of complaints, with VA
totaling 2,125); 2019 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 15 (identifying source of
complaints with VA totaling 1,843).
42
2013 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 15 (identifying source of complaints, with VA
totaling 985); 2014 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 16 (identifying source of
complaints, with VA totaling 1,504).
43
2014 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 16 (identifying source of complaints, with VA
totaling 1,504); 2015 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 15 (identifying source of
complaints, with VA totaling 2165).
38

612

Journal of Law and Public Affairs

[April 2021

has remained essentially flat since that time. 44 As late as 2019, OSC noted
that it “continue[d] to receive far more cases from VA employees than any
other agency.”45 Thus, at least a portion of the increase the number of
whistleblower disclosures may be attributable to the reporting of a higher
than normal amount of gross misconduct, fraud, abuse of authority, or
unlawful behavior in the federal government.
However, these explanations do not explain the decrease in
whistleblower disclosures since FY 2015, nor the lack of corresponding
decrease in retaliation claims since then. Whistleblower disclosures had been
increasing at OSC, with some variations each year, since FY 2006 up until
FY 2015. Between FY 2015 and FY 2018, disclosures dropped 20%.46 But
even though whistleblower disclosures peaked in FY 2015, PPP complaints
to OSC did not. PPP complaints have continued to rise over time, with a 2.8%
increase between FY 2015 and FY 2018. 47 While whistleblowers were
making fewer disclosures to OSC, more PPP complaints were being filed.
This divergence between number of disclosures and PPP complaints is
disturbing. As noted above, OSC offers a rationale for the increase in
complaints filed with OSC: the ongoing issues at the VA. However, this does
not explain why PPP complaints have failed to follow the same trend as
whistleblower disclosures. PPP complaints filed by employees at the
Department of Veterans Affairs peaked in FY 2015 and have stayed nearly
constant at the FY 2016 levels. While this number has been flat, whistleblower
disclosure numbers have been dropping. Thus, the issues at the Department of
Veterans Affairs do not appear to be the source of the divergence between
whistleblower disclosures and complaints filed with OSC.
There are a few plausible explanations for the divergence between
whistleblower disclosures and PPP complaints. The first possibility is that the
PPP complaints include non-whistleblower related claims, and that these
numbers obscure the trends in retaliation filings. This hypothesis is
impossible to analyze without disaggregated data. Second, it is possible that
retaliation numbers lag behind the disclosure numbers because retaliation
occurs after the disclosure, after which the employee has to consider the
circumstances and go through the process of filing a complaint with OSC.
44

2016 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 14 (identifying source of complaints, with VA
totaling 1,887); 2017 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 14 (identifying source of
complaints, with VA totaling 1,824); 2018 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 13
(identifying source of complaints, with VA totaling 2,125); 2019 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS.
ANN. REP. 15 (identifying source of complaints with VA totaling 1,843).
45
2019 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 14.
46
Id. at 27. While there is data for FY 2019, OSC noted that the data would have been
different if not for the government shutdown. See id. at 16. Thus, the best information is from
FY 2018.
47
See 2018 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS. ANN. REP. 15 (documenting the rise in claims). There
was a dip in claims in FY 2017, but the number rose again in FY 2018.
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There is some support for this proposition in the data. While disclosures
peaked in FY 2015, PPP complaints continued to increase in FY 2016 before
dropping in FY 2017. This later peak in FY 2016 could be the result of the
delay between disclosure and retaliation filing. On the other hand, disclosures
dipped slightly between FY 2012 and FY 2013, yet PPP complaints increased
between FY 2013 and FY 2014. Thus, a lagging retaliation claim is not a
satisfactory explanation for why disclosure filings dropped between FY 2015
and FY 2018 while PPP complaints increased.
There are other plausible reasons that retaliation cases have not
decreased at the same rate as whistleblower disclosures. It is possible that
retaliation has been increasing in the government, or that whistleblowers
perceive more retaliation. In other words, even though there are fewer
whistleblower disclosures, a higher percentage of those making disclosures
suffered from or believed they suffered from retaliation.48 Or, based on this
same divergence in data, the amount of retaliation is the same, as shown by the
fairly flat numbers of PPP complaints being filed, but fewer employees are
willing to go to OSC to make a whistleblower disclosure. The reasons for this
could be due to an increased fear of retaliation in general or a decrease in trust
in OSC. Regardless of whether there is more retaliation (or the perception of
it) or less trust in OSC, the overall drop in whistleblower disclosures coupled
with the flat numbers of PPP complaints is disturbing. Why is this divergence
occurring now? Part II, below, describes the anti-whistleblower tactics
undertaken by the Trump administration, which appear to be at least a part of
the reason for the drop in number of whistleblower disclosures.
II. LOSING WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS INDIRECTLY: THE WAR ON
WHISTLEBLOWERS
The history of whistleblowing protections for federal employees has
been a movement toward greater statutory protections. However, the actions
of the Trump administration have significantly undermined these statutory
protections. Social science research has demonstrated that whistleblowing
behavior decreases where organizational culture is not supportive of
whistleblowing.49 Even though whistleblowers have the same rights on paper
48

A related idea is that the rate of retaliation is not increasing, but employees perceive more
retaliation and thus file more claims. Determining whether there has been an actual versus
perceived increase in retaliation would require substantive review of all of the retaliation claims
filed with OSC. This is far beyond the scope of this work. Furthermore, even a perception of
increased retaliation has negative repercussions for whistleblowing, as discussed in Part II, so
it may not matter the extent to which either or both explanations are correct.
49
See PETER ROBERTS, A. J. BROWN & JANE OLSEN, WHISTLING WHILE THEY WORK: A
GOOD-PRACTICE GUIDE FOR MANAGING INTERNAL REPORTING OF WRONGDOING IN PUBLIC
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as they had under previous presidents, in reality, President Trump and his
administration created a culture where whistleblowing was fraught with peril.
The anti-whistleblowing culture was created by removing whistleblowers from
their positions, threatening them on social media, targeting them with criminal
investigations by the Department of Justice, and undermining the institutions
designed to protect whistleblowers. These efforts did not go unnoticed: as early
as 2017, a nonprofit was created to assist whistleblowers in the federal
government.50 The organization was sufficiently concerned about government
attempts to identify whistleblowers contacting the organization that it required
whistleblowers attempting to contact it to use a special browser to limit the
government’s ability to track users.51
Each of the approaches used by the Trump administration to
undermine whistleblower protections is examined below.
A. Public Firings/Removals of Whistleblowers
One way in which the Trump administration attempted to reduce
whistleblowing was to openly retaliate against those who disclose or report
wrongdoing within the administration and are not legally protected by federal
whistleblower statutes. The most well-known of these individuals is probably
Lieutenant Colonel Vindman, whose testimony before Congress supported
the allegations of the Ukraine whistleblower. 52 After President Trump was
acquitted by the Senate, he ordered LTC Vindman to be removed from his
position in the White House. In explaining LTC Vindman’s transfer out of
the White House, the President remarked that LTC Vindman, “did a lot of
bad things.”53 Other comments by the President included suggesting that the
military investigate LTC Vindman and calling him “insubordinate.” 54
Ultimately, LTC Vindman retired from active duty, stating that political
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5783160/trumps-attack-on-vindman-may-violate-whistleblower-protection-laws-but-challeng
ing-it-could-be-risky/ [https://perma.cc/RGC3-CFWK].
53
Id.
54
Id.

Vol. 6:4]

The War on Whistleblowers

615

retaliation would limit his future in the military. 55 In his own words: “I made
the difficult decision to retire because a campaign of bullying, intimidation
and retaliation by President Trump and his allies forever limited the
progression of my military career.”56
Several other individuals within the Trump administration who
testified in the impeachment inquiry in a way that was unfavorable to
President Trump also were removed from their positions in a public manner.
Gordon Sondland was removed from his position as the Ambassador to the
European Union after he testified to facts supporting the whistleblower’s
account of events.57
Another example of the removal of a federal employee that appears
to have been directed by President Trump and that relates to the impeachment
inquiry is the removal of Michael Atkinson, the Inspector General for the
intelligence community. Atkinson was removed because of his actions in
determining that the whistleblower’s complaint met the criteria for reporting
it to Congress, which he ultimately did. 58 Nor was Atkinson the only
Inspector General that President Trump removed. President Trump engaged
in a wholesale firing of Inspectors General in 2019–2020. Trump removed
Steve Linick, the Inspector General for the State Department, reportedly due
to several investigations that he was conducting of Secretary of State Michael
Pompeo’s behavior. Initial reports indicated that Inspector General Linick
was targeted because he was investigating Secretary Pompeo for unlawfully
using federal employees to perform personal errands.59 However,
55
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ander-vindman-retiring-military/story?id=71672510 [https://perma.cc/Z8WQ-9GEQ].
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What’s Right Matters., WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/opinions/2020/08/01/alexander-vindman-retiring-oped/ [https://perma.cc/9WMT-2E7U].
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information quickly came to light that Inspector General Linick was also
investigating Secretary Pompeo for allegedly pushing the sale of arms to
Saudi Arabia without approval from Congress. 60
In his purge of Inspectors General, President Trump also targeted
Inspector General Cristi Grimm at the Department of Health and Human
Services. The notice to remove Grimm came only a few weeks after her office
issued a report that highlighted problems with the response to the novel
coronavirus at hospitals in the United States and contained information that
contradicted President Trump’s characterizations about the circumstances of
the pandemic.61 Glenn Fine, the Inspector General for the Department of
Defense, was removed by Trump almost immediately after Congress gave
that Inspector General’s office additional oversight authority in connection
with huge spending bills passed to mitigate the effects of the pandemic. 62
President Trump removed acting Inspector General Mitch Behm from his
position at the Department of Transportation. Behm was purportedly
removed from his position because of his investigation into allegations that
the Department of Transportation, headed by Secretary Elaine Chao,
improperly provided preferential treatment to projects in Kentucky, where
Secretary Chao’s husband Mitch McConnell is a senator.63
The removal of employees who either spoke out publicly in a way that
suggested that President Trump engaged in wrongdoing or who were
investigating allegations of wrongdoing in the President’s administration
extended beyond the impeachment inquiry and beyond Inspectors General.
Indeed, it began early on in the Trump administration. In 2017, Joel Clement,
a senior policy advisor at the Department of Interior, was removed from his
position. Clement argued that the removal was in retaliation for his disclosure
of how climate change would affect native Alaskan communities. 64 Clement
was reassigned to a position involving auditing, an area in which he had no
60
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64
Darryl Fears, Interior Department Whistleblower Resigns; Bipartisan Former Appointees
Object to Zinke’s Statements, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://www.washington
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Vol. 6:4]

The War on Whistleblowers

617

experience. A subsequent investigation by the Inspector General found that
records of the removal were not kept as required by law and were so lacking
that it was impossible to determine whether Clement’s removal was
retaliatory.65 Clement was not the only employee at the Department of
Interior to allege retaliation for having engaged in whistleblowing. The
number of PPP complaints in the Department of Interior filed with OSC more
than doubled in the first year of the Trump administration, from twenty-nine
complaints in FY 2016 to seventy-two complaints in FY 2017.66
More recently, similar retaliation allegations were made by Dr. Rick
Bright. Dr. Bright was a top governmental employee who was working on
the COVID-19 response at the Department of Health and Human Services. 67
Dr. Bright had been the Director of BARDA, the Biomedical Advanced
Research Development Authority, as well as the Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Preparedness and Response. These entities worked on the US response to
disease outbreaks. When President Trump touted the use of unproven
treatments for COVID-19, Dr. Bright released information to the press about
the lack of efficacy of these treatments. The reason he gave for going to the
press was that he had attempted to work within the administration to change
the perspective on the efficacy of these treatments, but as the death toll from
COVID-19 rose, he felt that the public needed to know that the treatments were
not effective.68 Almost immediately after the reporter’s work was published,
Dr. Bright was removed from his position and transferred to NIH.69
The implications of demotion or removal are most dire for employees
who are not a part of the civil service. While Dr. Bright was not fired, he had
the capacity to legally challenge his removal, which he did. The set of legal
protections for civil servants includes two components: first, the right to directly
challenge retaliatory conduct that is caused by employee whistleblowing; and
second, the right to challenge significant disciplinary actions and removals on
the grounds that the government lacked cause for its decisions.70
Neela Banerjee, Investigators: We Can’t Tell if Interior Dept. Reassignments Were Legal
Due to Lack of Records, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Apr. 12, 2018), https://insideclimatenews.org/
news/11042018/zinke-interior-department-staff-reassignments-inspector-general-reportwhistleblower-joel-clement-doi-scientist [https://perma.cc/6HNV-48WN].
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Why?, GREENWIRE (May 22, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060082375/
search?keyword=Interior+Whistleblower+Complaints+Rise%2C+But+Why%3F+ [https://
perma.cc/5LB4-AGWZ].
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U.S. OFF. OF SPECIAL COUNS., COMPLAINT OF PROHIBITED PERSONNEL PRACTICE OR
OTHER PROHIBITED ACTIVITY: RICK BRIGHT, addendum at 6 (2020), https://context-cdn.
washingtonpost.com/notes/prod/default/documents/6bfde4d6-4c3d-4671-8eeb-6b3d39e47c
03/note/26f73d7a-d060-4c25-af4c-a58a167ee2c7.#page=1 [https://perma.cc/VSZ5-MXPL].
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On the other hand, some of those who were removed from their
positions by Trump— particularly political appointees—are unlikely to have
any recourse for their removal. For example, LTC Vindman’s removal may
be subject to challenge under the Military Whistleblowers Protection Act, 71
but it would be difficult to force Vindman’s reinstatement because of the
sensitive/confidential nature of the position. Gordon Sondland, the former
Ambassador to the European Union, was completely unprotected by any laws
for providing testimony to Congress that was supportive of the whistleblower
in the impeachment inquiry. Nor were the Inspectors General who President
Trump removed provided any protection against retaliation. The only
protection against removing an Inspector General is that the President has to
provide thirty days’ notice to Congress.72 And while some congressional
leaders have argued that the information provided by the President in these
removals has been inadequate, 73 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
determined in 2011 that a statement that the President had lost “the fullest
confidence” in an Inspector General was sufficient under the statute. 74 Thus,
as a practical matter, the President can fire any Inspector General at any time
for any or no reason.
These examples of employees who were removed for either blowing
the whistle or supporting investigations into wrongdoing are important
because the retaliation occurred very publicly and received significant
attention in the press.75 These public removals supported the approach of the
71

Abramson, supra note 52.
See 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(b) (“If an Inspector General is removed from office . . . the President
shall communicate in writing the reasons for any such removal or transfer to both Houses of
Congress, not later than 30 days before the removal or transfer.”)
73
See, e.g., Letter from Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, to Donald
Trump, President of the United States (May 18, 2020), https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/
51820 [https://perma.cc/T6E3-G7UG] (“You are required to notify Congress of your
removal of an Inspector General. It is essential that you also inform Congress of the cause
for the removal and your lack of confidence.”)
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Demoted for Prioritizing ‘Science and Safety’, WASH. POST (May 5, 2020, 6:55 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/05/05/rick-bright-hydroxychloroquine-whistle
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that a top policy advisor at the U.S. Department of the Interior was reassigned to a “lesser
position for speaking out about the dangers of climate change.”); Peter Baker, Trump Moves
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Trump administration to make it evident that those who openly report
wrongdoing in the Trump administration would be immediately punished.
And because there were no immediate consequences for those who retaliated,
the message became clear to potential whistleblowers that they would suffer
prompt retaliation. One of the goals was clearly to silence whistleblowers.
Some of those who have been removed tried to push back against this implicit
message of silencing whistleblowers. Michael Atkinson pleaded with federal
employees to continue to disclose wrongdoing, asking them, “Please do not
allow recent events to silence your voices.”76
B. Criminal Investigations of Whistleblowers
A second manner in which the Trump administration attempted to
reduce whistleblowing was to increase the number of criminal investigations
by the Department of Justice into disclosures to the media by federal
employees. The trend toward investigation and prosecution of employees
leaking information to the press did not actually begin under President
Trump. Instead, the move began under President Bush, where, “during the
CIA’s covert worldwide ‘war on terror,’ intelligence agencies and the Justice
Department began aggressive investigations of classified information ‘leaks’
to the news media.”77 The trend continued under President Obama, who set a
record for the most prosecutions (ten) of any administration of contractors
and employees who leaked information to the media. 78
President Trump took this same approach and has pushed even more
resources into investigating and prosecuting employee/contractor leaks.
Then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions reported in August 2017 that a new
focus on investigating leaks within the federal government would begin. 79
[https://perma.cc/ZPB8-JPEX] (reporting that a top official at the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services was replaced for “anger[ing]” President Trump with a report
“highlighting supply shortages and testing delays at hospitals during the coronavirus
pandemic.”); Eric Schmitt, Charlie Savage & Noah Weiland, Longtime Pentagon Watchdog
Stepping Down From Post, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/
26/us/politics/pentagon-inspector-general-glenn-fine.html [https://perma.cc/4HVW-WVKC]
(reporting that the head of a watchdog panel overseeing coronavirus pandemic relief
spending was “ousted by President Trump”, likely because of his “reputation for
aggressiveness”).
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DOJ tripled the number of leak investigations and directed the National
Security Division and U.S. Attorneys to prioritize these cases. Although
Attorney General Sessions’ briefing was only months into the Trump
administration, four prosecutions of leakers had already been announced.80
Since then, there have been additional prosecutions and convictions. Natalie
Edwards, an official in the Treasury Department, was charged with illegally
showing a journalist reports about President Trump’s wire transfers.81 She later
pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy in connection with the matter.82 Nor
is the Edwards’ situation an outlier. In just under three years, the Trump
administration indicted eight employees or contractors for leaking
information.83 At that rate, the Trump administration was on track to indict
more than twice as many employees/contractors as the Obama administration.
The effect of the increased focus on investigating and prosecuting
leaks was to chill whistleblowers. 84 Liz Hempowicz, the director of public
policy at the Project on Government Oversight, commented that “[t]hose
prosecutions [under the Espionage Act] in my perspective were meant to
make an example of these individuals . . . . making it less worth it for an
individual to come forward [to report wrongdoing].”85 Gabe Rottman,
technology and press freedom project director at the Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press, voiced similar concerns, stating that the trend toward
more prosecutions is “trying to dissuade sources from coming forward and
providing information to journalists.”86
C. Use of Media to Retaliate against Whistleblowers
In addition to removing employees who speak up about wrongdoing in
his administration and investigating/prosecuting those who leak information to
the press, President Trump used tactics to discourage whistleblowers that were
80
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dramatically different than in previous administrations: he used social media and
the press to directly impugn whistleblowers. Examples of his attacks on
whistleblowers, primarily on Twitter, abound. Trump called the whistleblower
who divulged the facts leading up to his impeachment, “a disgrace to our
country.”87 Other attacks on this whistleblower include attempting to cast doubt
on the motives of the whistleblower by calling him “highly partisan”88 and
impugning the whistleblower’s status by referring to him as a
“#FakeWhistleblower,”89 a “so-called” whistleblower 90 whose “2ND HAND
description of the call [between President Trump and the Ukrainian
President] is a fraud.”91 President Trump also suggested that the
whistleblower was a spy,92 worked for Joe Biden,93 and was a “Deep State”
operative.94 President Trump attacked the veracity and underlying accuracy
of the whistleblower’s allegations, tweeting that one of the alleged statements
by the whistleblower “is a very big Lie [sic],”95 and that the whistleblower
“had the facts wrong about the phone call.” 96
Riley Beggin, The Whistleblower’s Lawyer Says Attacking Him Is Illegal as Trump’s
Attacks Continue, VOX (Nov. 9, 2019, 10:24 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2019/11/9/20956525/trump-impeachment-whistleblower-lawyer-cease-desist-letter
[https://perma.cc/8Y3H-3BAW].
88
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 20, 2019, 8:27 AM), https://www.
thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22%E2%80%9Chighly+partisan%E2%80%9D+whistl
eblowers%22 [https://perma.cc/UW5B-YW2P]. Twitter permanently suspended President
Trump’s account in January 2021 “due to the risk of further incitement of violence.” Permanent
Suspension of @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER: BLOG (Jan. 8, 2021), https://blog.twitter.com/
en_us/topics/company/2020/suspension.html [https://perma.cc/ SQ4B-V9RS].
89
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 30, 2019, 8:44 AM), https://www.
thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22%23FakeWhistleblower%22 [https://perma.
cc/SA2B-ZN2E].
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thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22supposedly+comes+from+a+so-called%22
[https://perma.cc/GZ8D-BBE7].
91
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 30, 2019, 8:03 AM), https://www.
thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%222nd+hand+description%22 [https://perma.cc/
MTN7-4NV3].
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www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22whistleblower+spy%22 [https://perma.
cc/JCN2-L4XY].
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www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22whistleblower+deep+state%22 [https://
perma.cc/ZF33-48W6].
94
Id.
95
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 9, 2019, 7:43 AM), https://
www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22is+a+very+big+lie%22 [https://perma.
cc/B8D6-Z772].
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More recently, President Trump attacked Captain Crozier, the naval
officer whose letter disclosing large numbers of COVID-19 infections on his
vessel and asking for assistance was leaked to the press. President Trump
commented that “I thought it was terrible, what he did, to write a letter.”97
Promptly after the President made these comments, Captain Crozier was
removed from his command of an aircraft carrier.98 Trump also attacked Dr.
Bright, the whistleblower on the issue of the government’s coronavirus response,
tweeting that Dr. Bright “fabricates stories,” “spews lies,” and is “a creep.”99
President Trump’s attacks sometimes focused on the employee’s job
performance as a cover for reprisals taken. For example, when he ordered the
removal of Michael Atkinson as Inspector General for the intelligence
community, President Trump said that “[Atkinson] did a terrible job,
absolutely terrible.”100
Similarly, President Trump tweeted about LTC Vindman: “[H]e was
very insubordinate, reported contents of my ‘perfect’ calls incorrectly & . . .
was given a horrendous report by his superior, the man he reported to, who
publicly stated that Vindman had problems with judgement, adhering to the
chain of command, and leaking information.”101
Yet another approach taken by Trump in the media to attack
whistleblowers was to call for an investigation of the whistleblower—not the
allegations made by the whistleblower, but an investigation into the
whistleblower him- or herself. For instance, as to the whistleblower whose
complaint launched the impeachment, President Trump tweeted, “Why isn’t
the IG [Inspector General] investigating his so-called whistleblower?”102
More broadly, President Trump called for an investigation into the overall
system of protecting whistleblowers, tweeting that “[t]his whole

Max Boot, Opinion, Capt. Crozier’s Firing Shows the Growing Trumpification of the
Military, WASH. POST (Apr. 7, 2020, 9:26 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
2020/04/07/acting-navy-secretary-fired-then-insulted-navy-hero-he-must-go/ [https://perma.
cc/2HEQ-3JQA].
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www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22fabricates+stories%22 [https://
perma.cc/NA3E-D26M]; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 17, 2020,
10:15 PM), https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22spews+lies%22
[https://perma.cc/6U2Y-TUM2].
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101
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thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22very+insubordinate%22 [https://perma.
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Whistleblower [sic] racket needs to be looked at very closely, it is causing
great injustice & harm.”103
In addition to personally attacking whistleblowers, President Trump
attempted to intimidate whistleblowers by using the press and social medial. For
example, he made repeated efforts to reveal the identity of the whistleblower in
the intelligence community whose complaint led to the impeachment inquiry,104
to the extent that the whistleblower’s attorney sent a cease-and-desist letter to the
President.105 Under the relevant statute, the whistleblower was entitled to bring
his complaint anonymously, and the President’s repeated tweets asking where
the whistleblower was threatened that right.106 President Trump also appeared to
endorse the idea of suing the whistleblower.107
Similarly, the President attacked Dr. Bright, the official who alleged
he was removed from his position coordinating the attempts to create a
vaccine for COVID-19. When Dr. Bright filed his whistleblower complaint
and testified before a congressional subcommittee on the failings of the
Trump administration’s response to the novel coronavirus, President Trump
called Dr. Bright, “nothing more than a really unhappy, disgruntled
person.”108 President Trump also suggested that Dr. Bright should be fired,
tweeting that “to me he is a disgruntled employee, not liked or respected by
people I spoke to and who, with his attitude, should no longer be working for
our government!”109
103

Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 17, 2020, 10:15 PM), https://www.
thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22it+is+causing+great+injustice%22 [https://
perma.cc/Q9QF-2CRG].
104
See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 14, 2019, 6:39 AM), https://
www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22we+must+determine+the%22
[https://perma.cc/SK4R-NYYV] (“We must determine the Whistleblower’s [sic] identity.”).
105
Id.
106
See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 11, 2019, 3:26 PM),
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22where+is+the+whistleblowe
r+who+gave%22 [https://perma.cc/GTH6-WZUH] (“Where is the Whistleblower [sic] who
gave so much false information? Must testify . . . !”); see also Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 17, 2019, 3:12 PM), https://www.thetrump
archive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22Where+is+the+Fake+Whistleblower%22 [https://
perma.cc/V9RV-MRZP] (“Where is the Fake Whistleblower? [sic]”).
107
See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 11, 2020, 1:16 AM),
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22sue+the+whistleblower%22
[https://perma.cc/RP4U-T4DF] (retweeting @josepheschmitz’s call for the President to sue
the whistleblower).
108
Danielle Zoellner & Alex Woodward, Coronavirus Whistleblower Says ‘Lives Were Lost’
After Trump Administration Removed Him from Meetings Where He Raised Alarms, INDEP.
(May 14, 2020, 4:57 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/corona
virus-whistleblower-rick-bright-trump-white-house-a9514821.html [https://perma.cc/6Y332K9H].
109
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 14, 2020, 8:37 AM),
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Nor did President Trump limit his attacks to the whistleblowers
themselves. President Trump attacked those associated with the
whistleblowers. President Trump not only removed LTC Vindman from his
position, he also had LTC Vindman’s twin brother removed from his thencurrent position.110 As one commentator stated, “Such gratuitous scoresettling carries a whiff of the Cosa Nostra, in which talking to the feds results
in one’s family being targeted—in part to send a message to other potential
rats.”111 Similarly, Trump has attacked the Ukraine whistleblower’s attorney,
calling his behavior “treason.”112
Not only did President Trump himself attack whistleblowers, those
closely associated with him also did so. Donald Trump, Jr. attacked LTC
Vindman’s testimony before Congress, saying that “[a]nyone listening to
Vindman stammer through this seemingly trying to remember the Catch
Phrases he was well coached on should get that. He’s a low-level partisan
bureaucrat and nothing more.”113
President Trump’s targeting of whistleblowers and those close to
them has encouraged his supporters to follow his lead. High level supporters,
such as Rand Paul and other Republicans in Congress, called for the
whistleblower to be publicly identified. 114 Joseph DiGenova, a former
prosecutor and Trump supporter, built on the idea of the whistleblower being
a “spy” by saying that “[the whistleblower] worked at the CIA, and he is part
of a political assassination.”115 DiGenova followed up on this line of thought
by calling the whistleblower “John Wilkes Booth.” 116 After President Trump
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22to+me+he+is+a+disgruntled
+employee%22 [https://perma.cc/LT3T-LPYY].
110
Abramson, supra note 52.
111
Michelle Cottle, Opinion, Vengeance Is Mine, Saith the President, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/11/opinion/trump-impeachment-enemies.html?searchResult
Position=1 [https://perma.cc/2ARD-5Q3S].
112
Greg Sargent, Opinion, Death Threat to Whistleblower’s Lawyer Points to Trump’s
Depravity, WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2020, 4:42 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/op
inions/2020/02/20/death-threat-whistleblowers-lawyer-points-trumps-depravity/
[https://perma.cc/5VJY-R8H8].
113
Rebecca Shabad, White House, Trump Associates Trash Lt. Col. Vindman’s Testimony,
NBC NEWS (Nov. 19, 2019, 6:52 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-impeachmentinquiry/white-house-trump-associates-trash-lt-col-vindman-s-testimony-n1086351 [https://
perma.cc/VD6N-QDQH].
114
Dustin Volz, Trump Allies Ramp Up Efforts to Unmask Whistleblower, WALL ST. J. (Nov.
3, 2019, 2:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-allies-ramp-up-efforts-to-unmaskwhistleblower-11572724750?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=1 [https://perma.cc/6YWJQUTG].
115
David Corn, As Trump Attacks, Death Threats Against the Whistleblower and His
Lawyers Increase, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2019/11/as-trump-attacks-death-threats-against-the-whistleblower-and-his-lawyersincrease/ [https://perma.cc/66EX-L6R5].
116
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attacked the impeachment whistleblower and his attorney, both were
subjected to death threats. 117 The threats were significant enough that law
enforcement became involved,118 and ultimately one man was charged by
federal prosecutors with making a death threat aimed at the whistleblower’s
attorney.119 Similarly, LTC Vindman received so many attacks on social
media that he was provided with security for himself and his family.120
The point of all of the President’s attacks on whistleblowers was to
discourage whistleblowers. 121 Former Inspector General Michael Atkinson
recognized the risks created by these types of public attacks, noting in March
2020 that “the past six months have been a searing time for whistleblowers”
because whistleblowers are “allowed to be vilified, threatened, publicly
ridiculed.”122
D. Cutting Whistleblower Protection Resources
One of the ways in which whistleblowers protections have
indirectly been eroded in recent years is by the decreased funding of the
OSC. OSC’s FY 2021 Congressional Budget Justification shows a
decrease in funding as compared with previous years.123 OSC noted that
the decrease in funding would result in the need to eliminate fifteen fulltime employees and that it would not “be able to adequately carry out its
mission.”124 In addressing its staffing levels, OSC stated that it has seen
unprecedented increases in their caseload in recent years. 125 OSC also
117

Id.
Id.
119
Natasha Bertrand, 'All Traitors Must Die': Feds Charge Man for Threatening
Whistleblower Attorney, POLITICO (Feb. 20, 2020, 12:37 PM), https://www.politico.com/
news/2020/02/20/man-charged-threatening-whistleblower-attorney-116379 [https://perma.cc/
54WL-669B].
120
Luis Martinez, Army Providing Security Assistance to Vindman, a Key Witness in
Impeachment Hearings, ABC NEWS (Nov. 19, 2020, 2:51 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Pol
itics/army-providing-security-assistance-vindman-key-witness-impeachment/story?id=671372
82 [https://perma.cc/N7JH-3KWF].
121
Sargent, supra note 112.
122
Letter from Michael Atkinson, Inspector Gen. of the Intel. Cmty., to Charles Schumer,
Senate Minority Leader (March 18, 2020), https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000171-4737d6b1-a3f1-c7f715270000 [https://perma.cc/VQE3-4TEH].
123
U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS., FISCAL YEAR 2021 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION
& PERFORMANCE BUDGET GOALS 5 (2020), https://osc.gov/Documents/Resources/Congr
essional%20Matters/Congressional%20Budget%20Justifications/FY%202021%20Congres
sional%20Budget%20Justification.pdf [https://perma.cc/5THF-2C4G].
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Id.
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See id. at 6 (“Although OSC has received increased resources in previous appropriations
packages, the growth in OSC’s caseload and increases in personnel costs have far outpaced
its budget.”).
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noted that its ability to respond to allegations of wrongdoing, fraud, and
waste will be hampered by its budget. 126
OSC is a critically important fixture in promoting whistleblowing
within the federal government. OSC provides information to prospective
whistleblowers about the available ways in which federal employees can
provide information on wrongdoing. 127 It allows employees to confidentially
report wrongdoing, which OSC then investigates. 128 Furthermore, OSC’s
very nature promotes whistleblowing; social science research suggests that
lower level employees are more likely to report wrongdoing when there is a
reporting system that is external to their workplace.129 OSC acts as that
external reporting system due to its nature as an independent entity, separate
and apart from the agencies within which federal employees work.
The other federal agency that plays a role in protecting whistleblowers
is the Merit Systems Protection Board. The MSPB decides cases in which
whistleblowers allege that they have been retaliated against. As with OSC,
the MPSB’s budget was targeted by the Trump administration. In FY 2021,
the President’s budget provided for $42 million in funding, a cut of $4 million
from FY 2020.130 The Merit Systems Protection Board, in its FY 2021
Congressional Budget Justification, noted that any reduction in its budget
“would have a direct adverse impact on the agency’s ability to protect the
Federal merit systems, ensure due process, promote Government-wide merit
system principles (MSPs), and prevent prohibited personnel practices
(PPPs).”131 PPPs include claims made by whistleblowers who have suffered
from retaliation.132
Not only has there been there a lack of funding at the MSPB; there is
also a huge backlog of cases. The MPSB has lacked a quorum for over three
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Id. at 7.
OSC’s website is one of the primary ways it provides this information to federal
employees. See Disclosure of Wrongdoing Overview, U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS.,
https://osc.gov/Services/Pages/DU.aspx [https://perma.cc/G7XE-75UP] (last visited Mar.
19, 2021) (describing services OSC provides for reporting wrongdoing).
128
5 U.S.C. § 1213(h) (“The identity of any individual who makes a disclosure described in
subsection (a) may not be disclosed by the Special Counsel without such individual’s
consent . . . .”); see also id. (describing confidential reporting system).
129
Jingyu Gao, Robert Greenberg & Bernard Wong-On-Wing, Whistleblowing Intentions of
Lower-Level Employees: The Effect of Reporting Channel, Bystanders, and Wrongdoer
Power Status, 126 J. BUS. ETHICS 85, 96–97 (2015).
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U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., CONG. BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FY 2021 1 (2020), https://
www.mspb.gov/MSPBSEARCH/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber=1699850&version=1705794
&application=ACROBAT [https://perma.cc/7XWW-TAG4].
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years, beginning in January 2017 when Trump became president. 133 Without
a quorum, no cases can be decided by the Board. This has created a backlog
of over 2,500 cases, the largest in history.134 The lack of a quorum on the
board makes whistleblowers vulnerable to retaliation, according to the
Executive Director of the Senior Executives Association. 135
III. REVITALIZING WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS
Given the myriad attacks on whistleblowers, directly and indirectly,
by the Trump administration, it is essential to shore up whistleblower
protections for federal employees. This is a matter of both substance and
perception. Beyond the substantive changes in the legal system of
protections, congressional action will help counteract the negative messages
about whistleblowers during the Trump administration. I propose the
following options as ways of improving the current situation and sending a
message to whistleblowers that they will be protected by Congress.
Before detailing the options below, it is worth noting one option that I
do not include revitalizing First Amendment protections. While scholars have
spilled much ink agonizing over the current (minimal) state of First Amendment
protections for federal employee-whistleblowers,136 the practical reality is that
the current Supreme Court has been making it more difficult for whistleblowing
employees to obtain protections under the First Amendment, with no apparent
desire to improve such protections.137 Instead of focusing on the highly unlikely
133

Nicole Ogrysko, Lack of Quorum Hits 3-Year Mark at MSPB, With No Clear End in Sight,
FED. NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 24, 2020, 11:31 AM), https://federalnewsnetwork.com/workforce/
2020/01/lack-of-quorum-hits-3-year-mark-at-mspb-with-no-clear-end-in-sight/ [https://
perma.cc/PKA9-2R9Z].
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Whistleblowing Speech and the First Amendment,
93 IND. L.J. 267, 274–75 (2018) (proposing new protections for whistleblowers under the
First Amendment).
137
See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006) (creating the additional requirement
that an employee establish that his/her speech was not made as part of their professional
duties for the speech to enjoy First Amendment protection). There are numerous scholarly
works noting Garcetti’s negative effect on government employees. See, e.g., Paul M.
Secunda, Garcetti’s Impact on the First Amendment Speech Rights of Federal Employees, 7
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 117, 118 (2008) (outlining the three “reason[s] for Garcetti’s
magnified effect on federal employees.”); Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee
Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59
DUKE L.J. 1, 7 (2009) (lamenting the “government’s expansive claims to control public
employees’ expression” which “imperi[l] . . . the free speech rights of more than twenty
million government workers.”); Adam Shinar, Public Employee Speech and the Privatization
of the First Amendment, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2013) (“By stripping protections from
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rescue of whistleblowers by the Supreme Court, this Article suggests other
measures that have a greater likelihood of implementation.
A. Allow Anonymous Reporting to OSC
The current whistleblower protection laws for federal employees do
not provide for anonymous reporting of wrongdoing by most civil servants. 138
There are some exceptions. Within the intelligence community, there are
provisions for employees to blow the whistle anonymously, as illustrated by
the impeachment whistleblower. 139 However, this is the exception, not the
rule. At the present time, the only manner for most federal employees to
disclose information without openly revealing their identities is for them to file
a confidential complaint with the Office of the Special Counsel (OSC).140 Note
that this is not an anonymous report, only a confidential one, meaning that the
Special Counsel at least will know the identity of the whistleblower.141 And
while the Special Counsel is officially prohibited from revealing the identity of
the whistleblower without their consent,142 in the current political environment
it is quite plausible that identities could be leaked.
Creating a truly anonymous reporting option to OSC would promote
whistleblowing by those who are concerned about the not only on-the-job
retaliation, but also the public crucifixion of whistleblowers by presidents and
their followers.

public employees and converting them to at-will status, civil service reforms create a chilling
effect. Employees will be less likely to speak about government and express valuable dissent
if their job is on the line.”).
138
5 U.S.C. § 1213(a) (describing who is entitled to make disclosures to the Special Counsel
in OSC and Inspector Generals within agencies); id. at § 1213(h) (prohibiting the Special
Counsel, but not Inspectors General, from revealing the identity of the employee making the
disclosure without the employee’s consent).
139
See 50 U.S.C. § 3033 (denoting the duties of the Office of the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community as to creating an effective, accountable office that honestly selfregulates).
140
5 U.S.C. § 1213(h); see also Confidentiality & Anonymity When Filing A Disclosure
Claim, U.S. OFF. OF SPECIAL COUNS., https://osc.gov/Services/Pages/DU-Confidentiality.
aspx [https://perma.cc/783R-DGCT] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021) (discussing confidentiality
in reporting practices of OSC).
141
For a thorough discussion of the merits of anonymity versus confidentiality in
whistleblowing, see Tanya M. Marcum & Jacob Young, Blowing the Whistle in the Digital
Age: Are You Really Anonymous? The Perils and Pitfalls of Anonymity in Whistleblowing
Law, 17 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 1, 31–32 (2019).
142
5 U.S.C. § 1213(h).
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B. Promote Anonymous Reporting Channels to Congress
Many congressional committees have created a form for online
reporting by federal workers.143 These forms do allow for anonymous
reporting by allowing employees to withhold their names or contact
information. However, it is unclear to what extent employees are aware of
this option. There are outreach campaigns by the Office of Special Counsel
to promote reporting wrongdoing to the OCS,144 but no similar outreach by
Congress. Especially if Congress fails to create an option for anonymous
reporting to OSC, it would be beneficial to whistleblowers to make the
anonymous reporting options to Congress more widely known. There are
posting requirements for a number of federal employee protection laws; 145 it
would not be difficult for Congress to require that federal workplaces post
information on reporting options for whistleblowers. In addition, providing
this information on the OSC website and ensuring that OSC personnel make
this option known to employees would promote anonymous reporting.
C. Deter Identification of Anonymous Whistleblowers
In order to provide teeth to the anonymous reporting options
described above, Congress should amend current whistleblower protection
statutes to add provisions imposing consequences on those who disclose the
identity of anonymous whistleblowers. In the wake of the first impeachment
of President Trump, such provisions have been proposed as to anonymous
whistleblowers within the intelligence community. 146 However, it is not
merely whistleblowers in the intelligence community who should be
protected from the potential for exposure and social media attacks. All

143

See, e.g., Whistleblower Rights, HOUSE COMM. ON TRANSP. & INFRASTRUCTURE,
https://transportation.house.gov/whistleblower-rights [https://perma.cc/BU56-EFRT] (last
visited Mar. 10, 2021) (allowing anonymous reporting to the Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure); Whistleblowers, HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFF., https://
foreignaffairs.house.gov/whistleblowers [https://perma.cc/TS5L-J4RV] (last visited Mar.
10, 2021) (allowing anonymous reporting to the Foreign Affairs Committee).
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See Outreach, Training, & Certification Overview, U.S. OFF. OF SPECIAL COUNS.,
https://osc.gov/Services/Pages/Outreach.aspx [https://perma.cc/EX2Z-XVSW] (last visited
Mar. 10, 2021) (listing outreach opportunities).
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See “EEO is the Law” Poster, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.
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visited Mar. 10, 2021) (listing display requirements for equal employment opportunity laws).
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Emma Loop, After Trump’s Ukraine Scandal, Congress Is Moving to Strengthen
Whistleblower Protections, BUZZFEED NEWS (June 3, 2020, 4:37 PM), https://www.
buzzfeednews.com/article/emmaloop/trump-ukraine-impeachment-whistleblower-protections
[https://perma.cc/YG6R-9CMR].
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anonymous whistleblowers within the federal government should have their
anonymity preserved.
The difficulty with this approach is with determining how to deter the
identification of anonymous whistleblowers. If the person who discloses the
information is an employee within the civil service, it would be simple to
mandate that divulging the employee’s identity would be a disciplinary
offense for which the offender would face suspension or dismissal, depending
on the circumstances. Much more difficult to resolve would be the question
of how to handle disclosures of whistleblowers by Congresspersons,
Senators, and their staff. Making it a crime for a member of Congress or their
staff to disclose a whistleblower’s identity seems extreme. A lesser option
would be to allow a civil claim if the whistleblower faces significant
consequences, such as receiving threats of physical harm to themselves or
their family. The parameters of this type of civil claim are discussed in detail
in Section III.G, infra.
D. Protect Inspectors General from Retaliation
While federal law protects most federal employees against retaliation,
it does not protect Inspectors General. This omission needs to be remedied.
The relevant statute requires that Inspectors General be appointed, “by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, without regard
to political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and demonstrated
ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis,
public administration, or investigations.” 147 As the statute indicates,
Inspectors General represent a hybrid position in that the President has the
power to select them but by statutory mandate, they are not to be mere
partisan political operatives seeking to cover up wrongdoing.148 Furthermore,
the Inspectors General are a critical feature of the overall protection of federal
employee-whistleblowers.149 As Senator Charles Schumer stated: “Without
the courage of whistleblowers and the role of Inspectors General, the
American people may never have known how the President abused his power
in the Ukraine scandal.”150
Inspectors General, when not inhibited by fear of retaliation, are a
critical feature of the federal system of protections because they have the
power to hinder or promote investigations into whistleblowers’ allegations of
147

5 U.S.C. app. § 3(a).
Id.
149
See discussion supra Section I.A.
150
Marianne Levine, Schumer Asks Inspectors General to Investigate Whistleblower
Retaliation After Vindman Firing, POLITICO (Feb. 10, 2020, 5:30 AM) (emphasis added),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/10/schumer-investigate-whistleblower-retaliationvindman-113022 [https://perma.cc/CRL7-VF8N].
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wrongdoing.151 One of the tasks of Inspectors General is to oversee the
investigation of whistleblower allegations. 152 If Inspectors General
understand that they are likely to be removed for allowing allegations of
wrongdoing to come to light, there is a clear incentive to bury such
allegations. And while some allegations will not have negative political
implications for the sitting administration, it is inevitable that some will, and
that these may never come to light if Inspectors General are removed for
doing their statutorily-mandated duties. This concern is particularly acute in
areas where the whistleblower is dealing with information that is classified
or otherwise protected by statute. As discussed in Section II.B., supra, with
an increasing focus on investigating and prosecuting releases of such
information, if the Inspector General does not investigate and take action, and
the whistleblower discloses information to the media because they believe
that the public needs to know of such information, then the whistleblower is
putting themselves at a high risk of criminal investigation.
The challenge of the Inspector General position is determining what
type of protection officers should be provided. While the Inspector General
Act contemplates the appointment of an individual who will perform the
duties of the office in a nonpartisan, 153 competent154 way, these provisions
are not enforceable because the President retains the nearly unlimited
authority to remove the Inspectors General at any time by providing notice
and a reason for the removal to Congress.155 Thus, the integrity of the system
depends entirely on the individuals appointed and the President. Some
Inspectors General will follow their statutory mandates without regard to the
fact that they can be removed at the whim of the President. Others,
particularly after the purge of Inspectors General under President Trump, will
become at least somewhat more circumspect.
In order to ensure that the system of Inspectors General actually works,
one option is to change the nature of the Inspector General position. Inspectors
General could become career civil service positions not subject to the
appointments process. This approach would insulate Inspectors General from
political pressures far more effectively than the current system. Furthermore, it
has the potential to strengthen the civil service system by providing a powerful
protector within the system who is not subject to the political whims of the

151

See discussion supra Section II.A.
5 U.S.C. app. § 3(d)(1)(C).
153
This is evident from the requirement that the Inspector General be appointed without
regard to political affiliation. Id. § 3(a).
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This is evident from the requirement that the Inspector General have “demonstrated
ability” in the skills necessary for the position. Id.
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See discussion supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
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President.156 However, there are a couple of flaws with this approach. First, it
is possible that when a position becomes vacant and a new Inspector General
is hired, those in charge of the hiring process will be political appointees and
will focus on hiring an individual who, while not overtly political, shares a
political perspective with them. Second, having a person with the powers of an
Inspector General not be appointed by the President may infringe upon the
President’s rights under the Appointments Clause.
Even under the current statutory system, the constitutionality of the
removal provision of Inspector General positions has long been questioned.
When the Inspector General Act of 1978 was under consideration by
Congress, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel opined that
the draft legislation was unconstitutional for several reasons.157 Three of the
constitutional objections raised by the DOJ OLC focused on the reporting
obligations of Inspectors General to Congress—requirements this Article
does not touch upon.158 However, the fourth constitutional concern raised by
the DOJ OLC was that requiring the President to provide a reason for the
removal of an Inspector General violated that President’s constitutional right
to “remove Presidentially appointed executive officers.” 159 Despite this
objection, the final version of the Act contained the requirement that the
President provide a reason for the removal of an Inspector General. 160
The current state of the constitutionality of limitations on the
appointments power and removal power is unclear. Scholars of
administrative law such as Michael Livermore and Daniel Richardson have
described its state as being at “the breaking point.” 161 While there are many
reasons for this, one of the contributing factors is current Supreme Court
doctrine interpreting the Appointments Clause. In 2018, the Supreme Court
decided Lucia v. SEC,162 in which it determined that the Administrative Law
Judges at the Securities and Exchange Commission were improperly
considered a part of the civil service, and that they were properly to be
considered “officers” of the executive branch who are to be appointed by the
President.163 The Court applied a multi-part test. First, if a position is
156

A potential fringe benefit of this approach is that it might contribute to the lessening of
partisan volatility, at least within the civil service. See Michael A. Livermore & Daniel
Richardson, Administrative Law in an Era of Partisan Volatility, 69 EMORY L.J. 1, 4–6
(2019) (noting several reasons for the current state of “partisan volatility” for which the
current administrative law apparatus is ill-suited, including “the weakening of moderating
institutions such as the civil service.”).
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Inspector General Legislation, 1 Op. O.L.C 16, 18 (1977).
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“continuing” rather than temporary, that suggests the position is more likely
to be an “officer” rather than a mere “employee.”164 Second, if individuals have
“significant discretion” when carrying out “important functions,” that indicates
that they are officers, not employees.165 The Court, however, refused to provide
any additional guidance as to the meaning of these very broad concepts. Part
of this is likely due to an inability to reach consensus on the appropriate
parameters of the test to determine whether an individual is an “officer” or a
“mere employee.”166 It is quite likely that changing the status of the Inspectors
General to become part of the civil service will result in legal challenge. The
outcome of this challenge is not clear for two reasons. First, it is not clear
whether Inspectors General are “officers” who the president has the power to
appoint and remove. Second, if the Inspectors General are in fact officers
subject to presidential appointment, the Supreme Court has held that some forcause removal provisions do not violate the Constitution.167
As to the first point, because Inspectors General are clearly permanent
positions, which weighs in favor of “officer” rather than “employee,” the bulk
of the analysis will likely focus on whether they have “significant
discretion.”168 The fact that Inspectors General can conduct investigations
within their agency without oversight, including obtaining documents and
interviewing witnesses, suggests that they have significant discretion. 169
Thus, the question appear to devolve to whether these investigative powers
constitute “important functions.”170 The scope of what they can investigate,
which includes investigating the head of the agency in which they work, tends

164

Id. at 2052.
Id.
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The case spawned a dissent by Justices Gorsuch and Thomas, on one hand, which argued
for a new standard, and a separate dissent by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor,
which suggested that there was no need to even reach the constitutional issue. The approach
of the latter dissent may be to avoid reaching the constitutional issue out of concerns that the
conservative majority would substantially change the standard to make more positions
subject to the Appointments Clause. See id. at 2056–57 (Gorsuch, J., joined by Thomas, J.,
concurring); id. at 2057–64 (Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg and Sotomayor, JJ., concurring
in the judgement in part and dissenting in part).
167
See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958) (holding that the President’s power
to remove an executive officer must be conferred by Congress); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United
States, 295 U.S. 602, 631–32 (1935) (holding that President’s power to remove an officer
“will depend upon the character of the office”).
168
See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053 (discussing the exercise of “significant discretion” by the
SEC’s administrative law judges).
169
See 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(a) (“Neither the head of the establishment nor the officer next in
rank below such head shall prevent . . . the Inspector General from initiating . . . any audit or
investigation”); id. § 6(a) (providing the Inspector General with broad access to records,
reports, documents, and federal grand jury materials).
170
Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053.
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to indicate that their investigations, which are the heart of their position, are
“important functions.”171 It is quite likely that a court would determine that
Inspectors General are officers, not employees. 172
As to the right to limit removal of the Inspectors General, for-cause
removal provisions have been allowed at times. The state of the law is quite
complicated.173 For cause removal provisions have been allowed when the
position in question is adjudicatory in nature. 174 In the case of the Postmaster
General’s position, congressional reservation of removal rights was held to
be an improper usurpation of presidential power to remove at will.175
Furthermore, for-cause removal provisions have been allowed as to the head
of an independent agency.176 Inspectors General do not fall neatly into any of
these precedents.
Taking an approach along these lines, a bill was recently passed by
the House of Representatives that would not make Inspectors General career
civil service appointees, but would provide some limitations on firing
them.177 Under the Inspector General Independence Act, Inspectors General
could only be removed for permanent incapacity, inefficiency, neglect of
duty, knowing violation of a law, rule, or regulation, malfeasance, gross
mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or conviction of a
felony or conduct involving moral turpitude. 178 This approach would not
solve the constitutional issues discussed above because it still limits the
authority of the President to remove a high-ranking official.

171

Id.
It is also possible that a court would not focus on the Lucia approach, but instead would
draw upon the approach articulated in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting
Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010), in which the Court allowed for-cause removal
of members of the PAB. In that case, the focus of the Court was on presidential removal of
officers who “execute the laws.” Id. at 492, 496, 501.
173
See id. at 515 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the conflict between congressional
authority to create federal agencies and the presidential authority to appoint and remove
officers of such agencies). Justice Breyer’s dissent explains the problem concisely: the
Constitution is silent on removal authority, history is unclear on its scope, and the Court’s
precedents do not lead to a clear outcome. See id. at 515–19.
174
See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 623–28 (1935) (holding that FTC
commissioners may be removed by the President for cause); Wiener v. United States, 357
U.S. 349, 356 (1958) (holding that the President could not remove a member of an
adjudicatory body “merely because he wanted his own appointees on such a Commission”).
175
See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (“[T]he unrestricted power of
removal of first-class postmasters is denied to the President”).
176
See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 627–28 (permitting for-cause removal with respect to
the FTC, which “cannot be characterized as an arm or an eye of the executive” and “acts as
a legislative agency”).
177
The Heroes Act, H.R. 6800, 116th Cong. § 70104 (2020).
178
Id. § 70104(b)(2).
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This is not the first time that this approach has been proposed. In 2008,
the Inspector General Act was amended to require that Presidents provide
thirty days advance notice of removals of Inspectors General. 179 The draft bill
also proposed a seven-year term and limited removals to reasons similar to
those in the Heroes Act. 180
A less transformative, more incremental approach to protecting
Inspectors General would be to revise the statute to state that the President
must state the reasons, in detail, for the removal or transfer of an Inspector
General, including providing at least one specific example of the behavior,
conduct, or action(s) of the Inspector General that led to his or her removal
or transfer. This would help address the type of situation that arose when
President Trump removed Michael Atkinson. The President’s notice to
Congress was very vague, stating that the President had lost confidence in the
Inspector General, but there was no explanation of the circumstances that led
to the loss of confidence. 181 Some Senators pushed back on the President’s
letter, arguing that the legislative history of the removal provision in the
statute made it clear that Inspectors General should be removed only for
reasons such as malfeasance, failure to perform their duties, or for personal
actions that would discredit the office of Inspector General. 182 However,
while the legislative history may provide information on the goal of the law,
there is nothing in the statute as currently written that requires any degree of
detail on the reasons for the removal of an Inspector General. 183 And, as
discussed above, the statutory provision has been interpreted to allow the
most minimal statement of a reason—losing the “fullest confidence” in the
Inspector General.184 Thus, the most minimal change to the statute would be
to require greater detail in the reasons for the removal.
Another possibility would be to require that in the event of the
removal of an Inspector General, not only must the President provide the
reason(s) for the removal, but the notification to Congress would also trigger
a congressional committee or subcommittee hearing on the reasons for the
removal. The right to the hearing would provide a greater focus on the
removal and could assist in bringing public pressure to bear on the decision
179

Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, 110 Pub. L. No. 110-409, § 3(b), 122 Stat. 4302,
4302.
180
BEN WILHELM, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11546, REMOVAL OF INSPECTORS GENERAL:
RULES, PRACTICE, AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS (2020); H.R. 6800 § 70104.
181
See Savage supra note 58.
182
Letter from Charles Grassley et al., U.S. Senator, to Donald J. Trump, President of the
United States (Apr. 8, 2020) (citing JOINT STAFF REP. OF S. COMM. ON FIN. & H. COMM. ON
OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 111TH CONG., THE FIRING OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
THE CORPORATION/OR NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICE 47 (Comm. Print. 2009)).
183
See 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(b) (failing to require the reasoning behind an Inspector General’s
removal).
184
Walpin v. Corp. for Nat’l & Cmty. Servs., 630 F.3d 184, 187 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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to remove an Inspector General. It is far easier for a President to simply state
a reason—which could be anything—when there is no real opportunity for
the Inspector General to offer his or her version of events. This type of
hearing could provide additional incentives for the President to not fire
Inspectors General due to the more public nature of the termination.
E. Restore Necessary Resources for OSC and MSPB
An obvious way to shore up whistleblower protections is to ensure
that the offices that support whistleblowers receive adequate resources.
Congress should ensure that the budgetary needs of OSC are met so that the
office is properly equipped to support whistleblowers and investigate
disclosures made by whistleblowers. The MSPB also needs to be properly
funded and staffed. Additional funding may be required for the MSPB to
expeditiously eliminate the staggering backlog of cases.185
As for vacancies on the MSPB, it seems unlikely that any will be
appointed until after the November 2020 election. Regardless of the outcome
of the election, appointing members to the MPSB must be a priority for the
next administration. The political persuasion of the potential appointees is
less important than the need to reduce the massive backlog of cases.
Decisions by the MSPB are reviewable in federal court, which limits the
degree to which partisan political operatives can alter existing interpretations
of whistleblower protection laws.
F. Eliminate the Focus on Investigating Leaks, Amend the Espionage Act to
Limit Prosecutions, and Overhaul the Classification System
There are three ways of handling the excessive focus on investigating
and prosecuting federal employees and the media that began in the Obama
administration and was expanded in the Trump administration. First, and
most directly, the DOJ special unit focusing on leaks should be eliminated.
There is no evidence that the leaks investigated by its office had a negative
effect on our national security. Any small deterrent effect this unit has on
those who do have truly nefarious goals is likely overshadowed by its chilling
effect on disclosures that are legitimately in the public interest. At a
minimum, the focus of the unit should be shifted away from “leakers” and
instead into investigations of serious offenses.186
185

See supra text accompanying notes 133–35.
Another option would be to retain the unit and create guidelines for determining what
disclosures of information are appropriate for prosecution. See, e.g., David J. Ryan, National
Security Leaks, the Espionage Act, and Prosecutorial Discretion, 6 HOMELAND & NAT'L
SEC. L. REV. 59, 61 (2018) (explaining how the Obama administration created guidelines for
186
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Another option would be for Congress to amend the Espionage Act.
There have been numerous suggestions on how to do this to eliminate the
targeting of journalists and whistleblowers. One option would be to create a
scienter requirement; specifically, that the purpose of the individual
disclosing classified information is to harm the interests of the United States
and/or benefit the interests of a foreign government. 187 Another option is to
create an exception to the statute to allow disclosures to the media so long as
the whistleblower attempted to use internal reporting procedures, to no avail,
before disclosing classified information to the media.188
A third, and more indirect approach, would be to overhaul the
classification system in the federal government. Even Judge Ellis, a
conservative judge in the Fourth Circuit, has noted that the federal
government officials responsible for classifying information “over-classify;”
that is, when faced with information that might be considered classified, they
err on the side of categorizing it as classified. 189 Indeed, the congressional
advisory board tasked with assessing this issue recommended an overhaul of
the current system. 190 The current system is a composite of executive orders
and regulations, and a legislative overhaul is overdue. Part of this overhaul
should include higher standards for classifying information. 191 One of the
spillover effects of this would be to make it more difficult for administrations
to use the Espionage Act to target legitimate media reporting. 192 This is long
such prosecutions, and yet in the Trump administration there has been an increased focus on
prosecutions and investigations). Thus, it seems that incremental change is less likely to be
effective in this area.
187
See, e.g., Lindsay B. Barnes, The Changing Face of Espionage: Modern Times Call for
Amending the Espionage Act, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 511, 518–20 (2014) (exploring
revisions to the intent requirement).
188
See, e.g., Josh Zeman, “A Slender Reed Upon Which to Rely”: Amending the Espionage
Act to Protect Whistleblowers, 61 WAYNE L. REV. 149, 165 (2015) (proposing that the
Espionage Act be amended “to specifically preclude prosecution for those who leak
information to the media.”).
189
T. S. Ellis, III, National Security Trials: A Judge’s Perspective, 99 VA. L. REV. 1607,
1620 (2013).
190
See PUB. INT. DECLASSIFICATION BD., TRANSFORMING THE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SYSTEM: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ii–iii (2012), https://www.archives.gov/files/
declassification/pidb/recommendations/transforming-classification.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3EELEZR] (discussing recommendations pertaining to classification and declassification).
191
See Steven Aftergood, Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works, 27 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 399, 399–401 (2009) (discussing overclassification and the problems it
creates).
192
See Anthony L. Fargo, Protecting Journalists' Sources Without A Shield: Four Proposals,
24 COMM. L. & POL’Y 145, 147 (2019) (proposing that the federal government “[r]ein in the
out-of-control system for classifying government documents as ‘confidential,’ ‘secret’ or
‘top secret’ to improve the free flow of information to the public and reduce sources’
perceived need to risk prosecution by leaking documents to the press about government
activities whose disclosure would do no realistic harm to national security.”).
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overdue, but it was not essential when presidents were not targeting the
media. At this juncture, it seems prudent to take action to prevent another
administration from continuing the escalation of prosecutions of journalists
and the whistleblowers who disclose information to them. 193
G. Protect Whistleblowers from Social Media Attacks
It would be impossible in this Article to thoroughly discuss the ways
in which the current social media system needs to be changed in order to
effectively curb abuse online. The topic is complex and rapidly changing.
However, there are a few core concepts from the literature that can help frame
the issue in the context of whistleblowing.
1. Develop more effective internal rules in social media entities
First, social media platforms need to do a more effective job in
eliminating speech that threatens whistleblowers. As is nearly universally
recognized, at the present time, social media platforms do not manage speech
on their platforms effectively. Speech that is innocuous, such as a newspaper
posting portions of the Declaration of Independence, is censored, while hate
speech, including attacks and threats to individuals, 194 proliferates.
Legal scholars have, of course, recognized this problem and proposed
some solutions.195 As Annemarie Bridy effectively stated:
[W]e need some ground rules [for social media companies].
Practices better than those that platforms currently
demonstrate in this area include increased definitional clarity
with respect to categories of prohibited speech, greater
consistency with respect to content removals, and
implementation of efficient processes that allow users both
See Mark Norris, Comment, Bad “Leaker” or Good “Whistleblower”?—A Test, 64 CASE
W. RSRV. L. REV. 693, 706–07 (2013) (discussing one approach to balancing the interests of
government in classifying information and the need to protect whistleblowers).
194
See supra Part II (discussing examples of threats against whistleblowers in the Trump
administration).
195
There have been many approaches suggested on this topic. For additional examples—in
addition to the ones discussed in the text—see Charlie Warzel, Could Restorative Justice Fix
the Internet?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/20/
opinion/internet-harassment-restorative-justice.html?searchResultPosition=1
[https://perma.cc/2AM4-ME7Q] (discussing Lindsay Blackwell’s concept of using
restorative justice mediation principles); Ethan Baron, Fighting Hate on Facebook, Twitter,
Youtube: Brittan Heller, E. BAY TIMES (Oct. 10, 2018, 9:54 AM), https://www.east
baytimes.com/2018/09/27/fighting-hate-on-facebook-twitter-youtube-brittan-heller/ [https://
perma.cc/JE8N-8S9U] (explaining Brittan Heller’s suggestion that the way to eliminate
harassment and hate speech is via changing online social norms).
193
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to flag potential violations and to contest removals they
believe are unjustified.196
Bridy, while not explicitly stating this, appears to suggest that social media
platforms should be required to undertake these steps in order to retain their
immunity from legal liability for the speech that occurs on the platforms.197
Other scholars have been more cautious in suggesting that social media
platforms should better manage their content. For example, Cindy Cohn argues
that censoring speech tends to harm those who are less powerful and that it has
not been effective in the past.198 Thus, she is not enthusiastic about platforms
engaging in self-censorship because of these risks. Cohn proposes some
increased filtering by platforms, as well as other changes, such as platforms
being more transparent about their censorship decisions and developing tools
for individuals to filter the content they wish or do not wish to see.199
Another potential approach for social media platforms to follow is
found in international law. Existing international human rights standards are
one potential set of standards that social media platforms could use. 200 The
European Union has also set out requirements for social media platforms to
adhere to in order to eliminate hate speech and harassment.
Others have suggested that social media platforms not only need to
better regulate speech; they should also be legally liable for some harmful
speech on their platforms. Tort liability for these social media providers is one
such proposal, using existing tort claims such as negligence.201 Another model
that has been suggested is based off of copyright infringement claims.202
In short, as part of the need for social media platforms to better
regulate speech, consideration should be given to protecting whistleblowers
from online harassment.
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Annemarie Bridy, Remediating Social Media: A Layer-Conscious Approach, 24 B.U. J.
SCI. & TECH. L. 193, 219–20 (2018).
197
See id. (recommending that social media companies implement clearer, more consistent,
and more efficient processes).
198
Cindy Cohn, Bad Facts Make Bad Law: How Platform Censorship Has Failed So Far
and How to Ensure That the Response to Neo-Nazis Doesn't Make It Worse, 2 GEO. L. TECH.
REV. 432, 437–446 (2018).
199
Id. at 450–51.
200
See Evelyn Mary Aswad, The Future of Freedom of Expression Online, 17 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 26, 35 (2018) (concluding that speech codes can be based upon international
human rights standards).
201
See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Jaffe, From Terrorists to Trolls: Expanding Web Host Liability for
Live-Streaming, Swatting, and Cyberbullying, 26 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 51, 61–62 (2020)
(proposing a regime of tort liability for web hosts).
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Natalia Homchick, Reaching Through the “Ghost Doxer:” An Argument for Imposing
Secondary Liability on Online Intermediaries, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1307, 1333 (2019).
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2. Expand civil litigation and criminal prosecution of harassers
In addition to changing how social media platforms police their own
content, the law also has a role to play in combatting harassment of
whistleblowers. Again, this is an area of the law that cannot effectively be
covered in a segment of a law review article; it deserves its own full analysis.
Looming over all lawsuits is the First Amendment.203 Freedom of speech
does not, however, insulate all speech from liability.204 Working within the
confines of the First Amendment can still allow effective protection of
whistleblowers. These potential protections can be separated into two
components: civil claims and criminal prosecutions.
There are relatively few criminal prosecutions of those who engage
in online harassment.205 One of the reasons for this is the relative dearth of
state laws criminalizing the behavior; 206 another is the failure of local police
to recognize it as within their purview. The federal laws criminalizing cyber
harassment and cyber stalking also have been underenforced. 207 Even if the
police are willing to investigate, there is a whole host of other issues with
prosecuting harassers.208 And many statutes fail to criminalize those who
encourage harassment, 209 which is one manner in which whistleblowers have
been targeted. A multitude of different approaches have been advocated to
make criminal law more effective,210 well beyond the scope of this Article to
203

See Danielle Keats Citron, Addressing Cyber Harassment: An Overview of Hate Crimes
in Cyberspace, 6 CASE W. RSRV. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 8 (2015) (discussing the role of
the First Amendment).
204
Id.
205
See Emma Marshak, Online Harassment: A Legislative Solution, 54 HARV. J. LEGIS. 503,
508–17 (2017) (noting that less than 5% of cyber harassment victims report the harassment
to police and that local police often don’t consider it a crime).
206
See id. at 514–16 (discussing lack of statutes specifically targeting cyber harassment); id.
at 517–20 (discussing lack of police response).
207
Citron, supra note 203, at 5. Between 2012 and 2016, there were only prosecutions of
forty-one cases of cyberstalking and 280 cases of online threats. Joshua Eaton, Department of
Justice Turns a Blind Eye to Online Stalking and Abuse, THINK PROGRESS (Sept. 18, 2017, 12:21
PM), https://archive.thinkprogress.org/exclusive-department-of-justice-fails-to-prosecute-on
line-stalking-and-abuse-new-data-shows-c82e9cdc21ff/ [https://perma.cc/9QQ5-PC5N].
208
See Marshak, supra note 205, at 521–23 (discussing problems identifying the harasser
and prosecuting them).
209
See, e.g., Nicolle Parsons-Pollard, Cyberstalking Laws in the United States: Is There a
Need for Uniformity?, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 1, 3 (2010) (discussing need for this coverage).
210
See, e.g., id. (suggesting changes such as clearly defining harassment and including text
messaging in the category of cyberstalking behavior); Jacqueline D. Lipton, Combating
Cyber-Victimization, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1103, 1107 (2011) (suggesting modification
of current laws, such as revisions to criminal statutes and using civil rights statutes, as well
as proposing “extra-legal regulatory mechanisms that might better protect individual
reputations online”); Homchick, supra note 202, at 1315 (recommending imposing criminal
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discuss. In general, though, improving the investigation and prosecution of
online harassment will assist in protecting whistleblowers.
As for civil litigation, suing those who have engaged in online
harassment has had mixed results. Civil claims are allowed under the First
Amendment for harassing/stalking speech in some circumstances. 211 For
instance, the tort claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress has been
suggested as a viable claim in online harassment situations. 212 In some
instances, defamation claims are also viable. 213 In addition, there are
proposals for new statutory claims. One proposal has been to create a new
statutory claim under federal law where a person is “placed in reasonable fear
of death or serious bodily injury because of a perpetrator’s actions” by virtue
of receiving harassing communications via the internet. 214 Such a statute
would do much to potentially benefit whistleblowers subject to such online
harassment, particularly if the statute provides for attorney’s fees.215
CONCLUSION
The actions of the Trump administration revealed weaknesses in the
system of encouraging and protecting whistleblowers. His administration
targeted whistleblowers directly, by attacking them on social media and in
liability for doxing on the perpetrator, and if that individual is not identifiable, the online
platform); A. Meena Seralathan, Making the Time Fit the Crime: Clearly Defining Online
Harassment Crimes and Providing Incentives for Investigating Online Threats in the Digital
Age, 42 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 425, 432 (2016) (proposing redefining portions of criminal law
and importing standards for punishment of cyberstalking from other countries); P. Brooks
Fuller, Mosaic Theory and Cyberharassment: Using Privacy Principles to Clarify the Law
of Digital Harms and Free Speech, 22 COMM. L. & POL’Y 309, 315 (2017) (suggesting an
incremental approach under which “states reconceptualize unprotected harassment as any
intentional, patterned, persistent course of conduct that places the victim in a state of fear”).
211
For an excellent overview of the problems of cyber harassment, see Citron, supra note
203, at 1.
212
See, e.g., id. at 5; Juan M. Acevedo García, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Torts as the Best Legal Option for Victims: When Cyberbullying Conduct Falls Through the
Cracks of the U.S. Criminal Law System, 85 REV. JUR. U. P.R. 127, 160–65 (2016)
(discussing the viability of intentional infliction of emotional distress as a legal claim for
online harassment).
213
See, e.g., Heidi Frostestad Kuehl, Free Speech and Defamation in an Era of Social Media:
An Analysis of Federal and Illinois Norms in the Context of Anonymous Online Defamers,
36 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 28, 30 (2016) (discussing defamation claims for online harassment).
214
Kara Powell, Cyberstalking: Holding Perpetrators Accountable and Providing Relief for
Victims, 25 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 28 (2019).
215
Without attorney’s fees, it is unlikely that the recovery of damages would be sufficient to
induce attorneys to take the case. This would lead to a situation where only wealthy
individuals can afford to take action to stop online harassment. For federal employees, who
tend to earn less than their private sector counterparts, an attorney’s fees award is essential
for such a statute to provide meaningful relief.
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the news as well as by firing them, removing them from their jobs, and
ramping up criminal investigations into leaks within the federal
government.216 The Trump administration also targeted whistleblowers
indirectly, by failing to adequately support or fund existing whistleblower
protection resources and by refusing to enact policies to expand
whistleblower protections.217 The cumulative effect of this has been to
fundamentally change the culture of the federal government so that
whistleblowers have been discouraged and ceased disclosing wrongdoing.
This undermines the legislative work that Congress has done to improve
whistleblower protections over the years. 218 Congress needs to shore up and
expand whistleblower protections in order to prevent a continued reduction
in whistleblower disclosures by federal employees as well as to take action
to prevent or limit retaliation against them.
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